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Truth, Narration, and Interpretation in Lucian’s Verae Historiae 
 
Abstract: 
 
This article examines the representation of truth and interpretation in Lucian’s True 
Stories. The discussion is comprised of two parts: the first half brings under 
examination the rhetorical and philosophical significance of the preface’s key terms, 
and in particular the use of the term psychagōgia and its heritage. I point to certain 
Platonic and Aristophanic intertexts, through this term, which adumbrate exactly why 
Lucian forsakes truth for lies in his narrative. The second part of this article localizes 
in the famous meeting of Homer in the Isles of the Blessed the negation of truth as the 
essential aspect of rhetoric already set forward in the preface. Lucian’s text 
complicates interpretation through narratorial voices characterized as slippery because 
of their intertextual representations; this is seen not only in the unsatisfactory answers 
of Homer about his own poetry, but also through the new Homeric hexameter 
pastiches in book 2, which underline, through Homeric intertext, the inevitable 
epigonality of all texts and the unreliable nature of “true”, authorial pronouncements.  
 
--- 
 
Lucian’s fictional fantasy adventure the True Stories both encourages and 
problematizes interpretation.1 Its two-fold format of preface and main text sets a 
template for reading: the ‘authorial’ introduction lays strictures on the ways in which 
to interpret the main narrative, and attempts to control any meaning which readers 
will derive from this narrative. There is inevitably a continual backward glance to the 
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prefatory text, but it is not entirely clear what this manifesto for reading actually is. 
The preface is just as allusive as the narrative promises to be, but is illusive in the 
sense that Lucian does not explicitly tell the whole story: he leaves that for those who 
can fathom its hidden meaning.2 In what follows, I shall unpack some of the many 
layers which the preface contains, and assess the traditional rivalries, in particular 
those between rhetoric and philosophy,3 and truth and fiction,4 which Lucian raises 
through allusion to those debates in earlier key texts.5 I will then further explore the 
narratological tensions which the preface and main narrative create because of their 
apparently seamless apposition: the two narrative voices of these two types of text are 
ostensibly one voice, as the declared synonymy between the Lucian of the main text 
and the “Lucian” of the adventure story reveals. Through exploration of this narrative 
tension, and in particular the meeting of “Lucian” and Homer in the Isles of the 
Blessed towards the end of the narrative, I will argue that the very control over 
reading which the voice of the preface explicitly attempts,6 but which, on second 
reading, opposes, is replayed by the lack of control over the interpretation of his 
works which Homer has in the Netherworld. A number of studies have established, 
decisively, the anti-positivist nature of the True Stories:7 in this article I build on the 
collapse of authority in authorial pronouncements by exploring Lucian’s 
representation of truth through the narrator’s (and, by intertext, narrators’) 
philosophical and epic guises in the preface and main narrative. 
 
Psychagōgia 
 
The preface is comprised of three sections: the style of the work is elaborated, 
as is its usefulness both as relief from serious books and as a form of entertainment 
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and intellectual stimulation (1.1-1.2); second, the targets of its allusions are 
highlighted, and the tradition of falsehood in a range of genres is discussed, including 
epic poetry (1.2-1.3); third, we are told why Lucian is writing, how he differs from 
those writers of falsehood, and emphatic advice is given on how the reader must treat 
his narrative (1.3-1.4). All that follows, he declares, is false, and must not on any 
account be believed: he alone differs from his literary predecessors, in that he declares 
from the beginning that all that he writes is false (κἂν ἓν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο ἀληθεύσω 
λέγων ὅτι ψεύδοµαι, VH 1.4).8 
Elaborating his initial athletic comparison (1.1),9 where relaxation is shown as 
just as important as physical training for athletes, Lucian emphasizes the pleasurable 
aspects of his own text, for readers who are used to reading more serious works  (1.2): 
 
γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἐµµελὴς ἡ ἀνάπαυσις αὐτοῖς, εἰ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν 
ἀναγνωσµάτων ὁµιλοῖεν, ἃ µὴ µόνον ἐκ τοῦ ἀστείου τε καὶ χαρίεντος ψιλὴν 
παρέξει τὴν ψυχαγωγίαν, ἀλλά τινα καὶ θεωρίαν οὐκ ἄµουσον ἐπιδείξεται, 
οἷόν τι καὶ περὶ τῶνδε τῶν συγγραµµάτων φρονήσειν ὑπολαµβάνω· οὐ γὰρ 
µόνον τὸ ξένον τῆς ὑποθέσεως οὐδὲ τὸ χαρίεν τῆς προαιρέσεως ἐπαγωγὸν 
ἔσται αὐτοῖς οὐδ' ὅτι ψεύσµατα ποικίλα πιθανῶς τε καὶ ἐναλήθως 
ἐξενηνόχαµεν. 
It would be a harmonious repose for them, if they were to associate 
themselves with those types of books, which not only will provide sheer 
entertainment because of their refinement and cleverness,10 but will even show 
forth a spectacle not altogether without learning, and it is of this type which I 
believe they will consider the following writings of mine. For not only will the 
outlandishness of the subject nor the cleverness of its scope be enticing to 
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them but because I have told all sorts of lies in a persuasive and truth-
resembling manner. 
 
The designation psychagōgia as the intended effect of his work for his readers as they 
take pause from their more serious literary pursuits at first seems uncomplicated: as a 
result of the artful and pleasing nature of the narrative, the readers will have bare 
(psilos), that is, unadulterated,11 entertainment, psychagōgia which is not to be 
discovered but is a primary intended result of the style of literary composition.12 This 
entertainment is only half of the promise, as Lucian places emphasis in his first 
sentence on the but also clause: there will also be a display of the visual (theōria), but 
it is the first clause containing psychagōgia on which Lucian then playfully enlarges. 
What this psych-agōgia consists of is elaborated with ep-agōgia (here in its adjectival 
form ἐπαγωγόν predicated on to xenon and to charien, both of which, too, pick up on 
the previous sentence where it is stated that psychagōgia results from to asteion and 
to charien).13 The exoticness of the subject matter and the cleverness of the proairēsis 
are specifically the refined and clever things which will bring about psychagōgia.14  
 Lucian, however, is contradicting himself. In his ecphrastic Zeuxis, the 
narrator at the beginning of the work bemoans the fact that his lecture received praise 
not for the beauty of its style but rather for its exotic and novel subject matter. He 
then proceeds to show that the Centaur-picture by Zeuxis has a similar effect on 
viewers: all praise the ingenuity in subject-matter, but pass over the minute points of 
style which are responsible for the picture’s beauty; similarly with the battle-tactics of 
Antiochus – the sight of elephants charging the enemy are what in the end are 
remembered from his victory, rather than any military strategy of his own. Lucian 
plays at being just such a reader as he promotes his own narrative undertaking in the 
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True Stories, employing the vocabulary of Zeuxis 2: παρέντες αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἐπῄνουν 
µόνον τὸ καινὸν τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ ξενίζον.15 The novelty and foreignness have 
become the point, but rhetoric will lead the reader there.16 The foreignness epitomized 
in the centaur-picture, and now promised by Lucian in his relation of the outlandish 
adventures of his narrative, mimic the interpretation of similarly exotic matter in 
Homer. The bT scholion on Iliad 3.6, for example, explicates the Pygmy reference by 
resorting to the term psychagōgia because of the foreignness of the allusion: the 
reader is transported by the otherness.17 Just so does Lucian promise a similar type of 
drawing away from the ordinary to the extraordinary. It is not the artful composition 
that is to advertise itself, this time, according to Lucian’s methodology stated 
elsewhere,18 but rather has become a means to an end, a type of drawing of the soul 
towards something else. Lucian’s readership are alerted to another Lucianic voice, 
one which here contradicts, and therefore cautions against taking the narrator’s voice 
in this preface at face value in terms of its advocation of pleasure and novelty for their 
own sake.19  
 The placement of psychagōgia within prefatory material is not unique: the 
term by Lucian’s time has become almost commonplace as a signifier for the opposite 
of didacticism.20 A noteworthy example is Strabo’s realignment (1.1.8), contra the 
Hellenistic geographer Eratosthenes, of poetry as didactic, instead of merely as 
entertaining (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅ φησιν Ἐρατοσθένης, ὅτι ποιητὴς πᾶς 
στοχάζεται ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας).21 At 2.2.3 he even goes so far as to state 
that poetry in early education is not for mere (psilos) entertainment, but for the sake 
of moral discipline. Yet it seems that Lucian is indeed setting up his own work as 
intended for bare entertainment, as a break from the more serious literary tasks his 
readers may be engaged in; these same readers may still gain something worthwhile 
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from his work, as he will also “display a cultured contemplation (theoria)”.22 
Similarly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in the preface of his Roman Antiquities (1.8.3), 
had already appealed to the varying types of reader who might take up his work: not 
only those interested in philosophical speculation (philosophos… theoria, 1.8.3) but 
also those who wish to read history for its sheer entertainment value (diagōgē).23  
If, indeed, Lucian’s statement on the purpose of his work is to be taken at 
face-value, that his work is truly a rest for those who engage in serious reading, then 
the reader need delve no further for secondary import for the terms applied in the 
preface. The term psychagōgia,24 however, alerts the reader to the possibility of 
further rhetorical sub-text, or meta-commentary on the function of rhetoric; its use 
here in a passage which puts forward a theory and methodology of literary 
composition is bound to be intertextually significant. The preface is essentially 
metaleptic as a whole of the narrative which it frames. Within this setting, this is an 
intertext which directs the reader to previous philosophical debates, debates which are 
most likely to be foregrounded in this preface given that this very preface is a 
discussion of the history of writing and of the representation of truth through those 
writings. 25 Lucian uses the term elsewhere, either as substantive or in its verbal form, 
five times, two of which concern the primary meaning of leading souls, literally 
(Dial. D. 4.1 and 11.4). Its other occurrences relate to entertainment, and especially 
the provocation of laughter (Nigrinus 18.8 and 21.2, and Bis Acc. 10.18). Nigrinus 
18.8 is especially significant, as the narrator describes himself as like a spectator in a 
theatre, as he gains entertainment by viewing the masses of humanity through the lens 
of philosophy and truth, his companions.26 Within a setting of discourse on authors 
who have told lies, and on his own text which will differ as truthful, psychagōgia, 
because of its philosophical and rhetorical pedigree, is worth a second look. The 
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preface is framed by two Platonic intertexts:27 the first, the athletic comparison 
derived from Plato’s Laws,28 has been shown to underline the necessary paideia 
which the preface elicits on the part of its readers; this is a text for the elite.29 The 
second Platonic intertext is the template in which Lucian formulates his key 
pronouncement at the end of the preface:  
 
VH 1.4: κἂν ἓν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο ἀληθεύσω λέγων ὅτι ψεύδοµαι. οὕτω δ' ἄν µοι 
δοκῶ καὶ τὴν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορίαν ἐκφυγεῖν αὐτὸς ὁµολογῶν µηδὲν 
ἀληθὲς λέγειν. 
For in this one thing I will tell the truth, in saying that I lie. In this way I think 
I will escape the censure from others, in confessing that nothing I say is true. 
 
Plato Apology 21d: 
ἀλλ' οὗτος µὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ 
οἴοµαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σµικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ 
µὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴοµαι εἰδέναι. 
But this man thinks that he knows something even though he does not know 
something, but I, as I then do not know something, do not think that I know 
something. It is likely, therefore, that I am in this small respect wiser than that 
man, in that I neither know nor think I know those things. 
 
The Apology intertext holds the key to understanding how to interpret the 
preface, and especially as regards the representation of truth. Lucian has chosen to 
formulate his most truthful statement with which he claims he differs from all his 
predecessors, in one of the most equivocal and ironical assertions of Socrates.30 The 
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Apology as a defence by Socrates of himself, based on allegations made against him, 
starts off by discoursing on who speaks the truth, and who in actual fact is a clever 
speaker, and therefore a manipulator of hearers and of the truth.31 Socrates retorts that 
he is not a clever rhētōr, and on this basis, as someone without the skills to deceive, is 
a man of truth (17b6-8).32 Socrates is speaking to defend himself against charges of 
speaking falsely, of making the weaker argument the stronger through clever speaking 
and of corrupting the young.33 Lucian, ironically, and Socratically, defends any 
possible charge that he is just as bad as those who lie in their narratives, as unlike 
them, he does not conceal the fact or pretend that he is telling the truth. Socrates, in 
the Apology, goes on to discuss the enjoyment he could have in the afterlife, where he 
could meet the famous characters of history and folklore, and with whom he could 
converse. This is the very scenario which Lucian constructs in book 2 of his own 
narrative, in the Isles of the Blessed, where the actor-narrator ‘Lucian’ gets to do just 
that, as a Socrates-type figure.34 The setting of Lucian’s proclamation of truth as 
Socratic, and in particular set within a dialogue with the Apology, inevitably works in 
both directions: Socrates’ statement adumbrates the meaning in Lucian, and Lucian’s 
statement reflects back on Socrates’ words. Both narrators are represented as 
concerned with truth and its representation:35 both protest that they openly, and 
without guile, speak the truth, but both have these protestations undercut by the very 
manner in which their defences are made. Lucian promises psychagōgia, to delight 
the readers in their exploration of the lies set forth, while Socrates’ own Apology is 
constructed in the manner of a law-court defence speech, one which requires the art of 
speaking.36  
Lucian’s narrator, then, has been set up as a Socratic voice. This template 
from the Apology raises typically Platonic/Socratic questions which are hinted at 
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already in the first half of the preface: what is fiction for, and how are we to receive 
Lucian’s pronouncements? Lucian’s main narrative, according to this model, consists 
of mythoi or pseusmata which have this distinct (Socratic) usefulness,37 and one 
which Lucian advertises, namely of elucidating questions raised at the beginning: not 
only do they lead the reader back to decipher the preface itself, but they also contain 
these enigmatical allusions to certain of the poets, philosophers and historians who 
told lies.38 Fiction, therefore, can teach the reader about the function of to pseudos, 
within those three genres, within literary tradition. To work out Lucian’s aenigmata is 
to learn about the history of Greek literature, as received by pepaideumenoi in 
Lucian’s post-Socratic cultural milieu.39  
The Socratic Lucian has twisted the famous axiom, and rephrased Socrates’ 
account of himself as not only the only person who knew the difference between truth 
and lies, but who also spoke lies. The irony of Socrates’ statement is that he does in 
fact know something, even if that is only the knowledge of ignorance.40 Lucian 
balances this irony by pointing his own true statement in the direction of lies: there is 
no truth, only lies, and therein lies his truth. Lucian interprets the Socratic dictum by 
subverting it: in that Socrates’ knowledge amounts only to ignorance, so too does the 
narrator’s confession amount to lies. The truth as it stands according to Lucian is that 
there is none, and this conclusion extends to Lucian’s own interpretation of Plato’s 
Socrates – the philosopher’s actual, un-ironical, ignorance is laid bare.41 All trust in 
Lucian’s narrator, and in the narrative he prefaces, is therefore disavowed, as he 
charges the reader with the parting advice to believe nothing that follows (1.4).42  
Lucian promises to allude to, or parody, a number of philosophers, poets and 
historians in a manner not without its comedic aspects, ἀκωµῳδήτως (1.2). This 
adverb, invented here by Lucian, signifies in particular that Lucian will parody these 
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writers in a way done already in Old Comedy.43 Aristophanes’ parody is famous in his 
Clouds, in particular, but the chorus in the Birds (1555) designates Socrates as a 
leader, or beguiler of souls, in terminology evoked by Lucian’s preface. 
 
Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς Σκιάποσιν λί- 
µνη τις ἔστ’, ἄλουτος οὗ 
ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης. 
By the Shadow-feet there is a marsh,44 where unwashed Socrates conjures 
souls (Birds 1553-5). 
 
The primary reference behind this passage is the necromantic scene in Odyssey 11,45 
which fits the primary meaning of the verb here, of leading souls.46 There can be little 
doubt too, that Aristophanes plays with the secondary meaning of the verb, of 
charming, or beguiling souls, a meaning seen too in Phaedrus 261a, discussed 
below.47 Lucian brings out a number of interpretations of the Socratic voice by which, 
because of the Platonic intertexts in the preface, his narrator is essentially 
characterized. The idea of entertainment, psychagōgia, contains too this additional, 
root-meaning of drawing souls, of beguilement. Lucian, like Socrates, is drawing 
readers. This narrator’s insistence on his veracity is undercut not only by the 
Apologian statement that he will lie, but by the manifold guises that Socrates himself 
can be received by readers, through the lens of Aristophanes as well as Plato himself. 
Lucian’s Socratic persona is certainly the Socrates of the Apology, but variegated 
according to the type represented in Aristophanes.48 Plato, in the guise of his Socrates, 
propagates a persona behind which he himself can hide: Socrates may represent his 
own philosophical thinking, but this slippery narrative-duality essentially protects the 
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author – these utterances of Socrates are just that, utterances of Socrates, as far as his 
own literary, dialogical form go. So, too, Lucian appropriates a Socratic image for his 
own preface, but by implication, there is a “Plato” behind his “Socrates”.49 As much 
as Socrates represents himself in the Apology as lacking the cleverness to deceive his 
speakers, Lucian’s narrator sets himself up as someone who will tell lies, and 
therefore deceive, and the clearest statement of this deception is set in the clearest 
Socratic setting of the Apology, at the end of the preface (1.4). The specific 
Aristophanic contamination of the picture of Socrates set up especially in the Clouds 
is seen in the setting and function of the Socratic intertexts in Lucian. In the Clouds, 
Socrates is represented as encouraging his young followers to use rhetoric for less 
noble means,50 and it is “Wrong” (ὁ κρείττων λόγος) who represents the embodiment 
of Socrates’s teaching (Clouds 889). There are two representations of Socrates to 
choose from, and Lucian seems to appropriate an Aristophanic reception.51 In re-
establishing Aristophanes’ critique of the slippery speaker Socrates, Lucian denies the 
very defence of Socrates against that caricature at Apology 198d-20c3.52  
 
Socrates on Rhetoric 
 
 In addition to my initial reading thus far of psychagōgia as a non-didactic type 
of pleasurable entertainment lurks a more complicated sense, one which re-enacts the 
fundamental debate on the function of rhetoric and its relation to truth. Socrates in the 
Apology used rhetoric to prove that he was being wrongly charged, but this very 
rhetorical guise is represented by Aristophanes as part of Socrates’ untrustworthy, 
beguiling, characteristics. Through these receptions and embedding of the Socratic 
persona in the preface lies another point of reference for psychagōgia: Plato’s 
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Phaedrus. The term’s first occurrence in Plato is in the Phaedrus, and only in that 
dialogue does Plato use its substantival form (at 261a8 and 271c10).  
 
261a8-b2: ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ µὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις 
διὰ λόγων, οὐ µόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δηµόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις, ἡ αὐτὴ σµικρῶν τε καὶ µεγάλων πέρι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντιµότερον τό 
γε ὀρθὸν περὶ σπουδαῖα ἢ περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόµενον; ἢ πῶς σὺ ταῦτ' ἀκήκοας; 
Then surely as a whole rhetorical technē would be a psychagōgia through 
words, not only in the law-courts and as many other public gatherings as 
pertain, but also in private places too, the same art about both small and great 
issues, nothing considered more important in its application, whether about 
serious matters or trivial matters? What report have you heard about these 
things? 
 
271c10-d2: ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναµις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα, τὸν 
µέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει. 
Since the function of speech happens to be psychagōgia, it is necessary that 
the person intent on using rhetoric know the soul in all its forms.  
 
Both instances in the Phaedrus define rhetorical skill as a type of 
psychagōgia. Contrary to his earlier stance in the Gorgias,53 in the Phaedrus Plato 
allows Socrates to accommodate the usefulness of rhetoric, even to the extent that 
Socrates now admits that rhetoric is a technē of sorts, an art of anti-logic, which 
concerns both public and private affairs, whereby a speaker can make one thing seem 
like its opposite.54 He finds for genuine rhetoric a nobler purpose this time, namely a 
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chief function in the search for the truth (257b-279c), a purpose based on the 
definitions connected to psychagōgia. Socrates applies the root meaning of the term 
‘leading the soul’ to convey the nature of true rhetoric, namely, to lead the soul to the 
truth, by means of words. As a result, the speaker of the rhetorical art must first know 
the truth, that is the true definition of a concept, before attempting to persuade 
someone about that concept, even if that persuasion leads to the opposite of that truth 
(deception):55 one cannot know the anti-logos without knowing first the true logos. 
Rhetoric requires knowledge of the truth.56 
That Lucian is appropriating the Phaedran use of the term as a background to 
his own careful dialectic on truth and fiction becomes all the more likely given his 
explicit use of the dialogue in his De Domo (4).57 In his discussion of the effect of 
visual beauty and the inevitable response in words, the narrator discusses the beauty 
of Socrates’ setting in the Phaedrus which results in his discourse about rhetoric and 
the Muses. The terms used to describe Socrates’ setting seem to be played with here, 
too, in the preface. Socrates is led astray to an exotic location,58 where he and 
Phaedrus will discuss the purpose of rhetoric. The katagōgē is beautiful (230b2): 
everything is in full bloom (ὡς ἀκµήν, 230b4);59 a most pleasing stream (πηγὴ 
χαριεστάτη, 230b6) flows by; Phaedrus has most excellently led him astray (ἄριστά 
σοι ἐξενάγηται, 230c5); and Socrates is like someone on foreign soil, someone who 
never strays beyond the city (ξεναγουµένῳ τινί... οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος, 230c7-d1). 
The setting in the Phaedrus for their new discourse mimics the very act of 
psychagōgia: Socrates, in reality, in his search for self-knowledge (229e) has led 
Phaedrus to this unfamiliar setting, which is separated by a river which marks a sacred 
border (like the Stygian waters which separate the living from the dead), to a holy 
place, admittance to which may be gained through ritual expiation and prayer (242b-c 
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and 279b-c).60 Lucian, too, promises separation from the everyday, and in fact, at the 
beginning of the main narrative (1.5), the narrator sets out at the traditional outer-edge 
of the known world, by embarking from the pillars of Heracles.61 Lucian’s narrative 
journey mimics the exotic setting of the Phaedrus, but it is Lucian’s language and 
discourse which provide the advertised psychagōgia, and in this he figuratively plays 
on the topographical novelty of the Phaedrus: his style will provide psychagōgia 
because of its pleasantness (χαρίεντος, 1.2), as will the subject matter (τὸ χαρίεν τῆς 
προαιρέσεως, 1.2). Just as Socrates (230c7) is like a xenos led away (agoumenos), so 
too will the xenon of the hypothesis of Lucian’s tale lead the reader away (τὸ ξένον 
τῆς ὑποθέσεως… ἐπαγωγὸν ἔσται, 1.2), as part of the psychagōgia. Just as Plato plays 
with the –agō compounds (katagōgē – exenagētai – xenagoumenōi),62 so too does 
Lucian with pysch- and ep- agōgia.63 Lucian even seems to pun on the Phaedran 
statement that Socrates has been led out of his accustomed habitat, ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος 
(230d1), with ἐκ τοῦ ἀστείου... παρέξει τὴν ψυχαγωγίαν (1.2), the latter adjective 
derived from the noun ἄστυ.64 What Socrates says is the pharmakon that has led him 
out of the way is speeches in books (230d6-9).65 So too does Lucian entice his readers 
with his own syngrammata (1.2).  
The question therefore arises: why does Lucian seem to appropriate the 
Phaedrus here, especially in its definition of psychagōgia?66 The Phaedran template 
which neatly fits the programme put forward in Lucian’s preface is its insistence that 
the practitioner of rhetoric must know the truth of a subject that he is about to speak 
or write about (Phaedrus 277b5-6).67 At first, Lucian seems to contradict this dictum: 
his psychagōgia will consist not only in the novelty of his subject matter and style but 
because he tells lies in the most convincing way: he uses rhetoric to lead the reader 
astray, or literally, to entice the soul – and this purpose is undisguised (psilos, 1.2). 
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But the reader is to be under no illusion that in what follows Lucian is trying to 
deceive: they are warned at the end of the preface that all that follows is falsehood, 
and that they are to believe none of it (1.4).68 Therefore Lucian does indeed, at face 
value at least, follow the strictures set down by Socrates: as a writer of a narrative 
which promises all sorts of lies, set forth with rhetorical skill, Lucian premises his 
story with the truth: namely, that there is no truth in what follows, only lies. Yet, it 
follows that to write lies is to pre-suppose knowledge of the opposite, something the 
foregrounding of the Phaedrus in the preface cements into interpretation. In addition, 
to write lies is to lead one away from the truth. This is something Lucian makes clear 
elsewhere, for example in Calumniae non temere credendum 11: slander (which by 
rights is based on falsehood) is stronger than truth because of its seductive and 
plausible aspects, among many other things (both of those adjectives, epagōgon and 
pithanon, are used too at 1.2 in the preface of the VH).69 
Wariness of rhetoric and its ability to tell lies ‘truthfully’, based on warnings 
throughout Lucian’s oeuvre,70 is further heightened by the very vocabulary Lucian 
employs here to describe his lying output which will follow. Neither of the adverbs 
Lucian posits with the verb ἐξενηνόχαµεν (1.2) is without wider implication.71 Lucian 
has juxtaposed with pseusmata the seemingly antithetical adverbs which point to 
persuasion and truth. Both of the adverbs pithanōs and enalēthōs – the latter is a 
coinage by Lucian – have specific connotations of rhetorical display. 72  In its 
adjectival form,73 the latter is used by ps.-Longinus (15.8) to express the ideal effect 
of exaggeration in rhetoric, namely one of reality and truth. The fairest aspect of 
rhetorical phantasy is always practical and truth-like (τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς φαντασίας 
κάλλιστον ἀεὶ τὸ ἔµπρακτον καὶ ἐνάληθες).74 Lucian’s use of rhetoric will also be 
truth-like, but only to make the lies he will tell more believable and (therefore) 
Truth,	  Narration,	  and	  Interpretation	  in	  Lucian’s	  Verae	  Historiae	  
	   16	  
pleasurable, because they are truth-like. Pithanōs too signifies rhetorical theory.75 At 
the beginning of Plato’s Apology, Socrates describes his accusers as those who are 
accustomed to speaking πιθανῶς, that is, he makes an allusion to the style of 
Gorgianic oratory which is based principally upon the aim of persuasion, Peithō, a 
word, with its verbal counterpart, which is used repeatedly in Plato’s Gorgias to 
underscore the nature of that rhetoric.76 Lucian is carefully positing words which 
activate key rhetorical historical functions: beside the Phaedran debate on rhetoric 
lurks Gorgias’ more utilitarian and deceptive application, something the Phaedrus 
sets out to improve upon. The reader must decide which function Lucian himself 
appropriates here, as the narrator subtly overlaps and entwines vocabulary of 
truthfulness with lies in the preface, pointing, implicitly, to their indivisible 
relationship through the very language he employs. 
The function of to pseudos is closely connected to rhetoric. Lucian’s tales will 
be theoria not amousos (a spectacle not without art) (1.2), in the same way that 
writers such as Iambulus wrote many paradoxa, employing believable fiction, but 
with a hypothesis that was not aterpnon (without pleasure) (1.3). Mythos, or to 
pseudos, can have a utilitarian purpose, as Socrates demonstrates not only in the 
Phaedrus, in his manifold use of mythological analogy.77 Lucian excuses the poets for 
this in the Philopseudes, since (4) the delight which poetry affords is necessary for the 
readers’ enjoyment: Lucian re-employs the vocabulary of pleasure at Philopseudes 4 
(τὸ ἐκ τοῦ µύθου τερπνὸν ἐπαγωγότατον ὄν) in VH 1.3 and 1.4. Lucian is now like 
one of those poets he excused. For Lucian, mythos signals lies, especially through the 
vehicle of rhetoric, but such telling of myths, the shaping of falsehood in a way 
believable to all provides, by implication, a hypothesis that brings to terpnon (1.3).78 
Only those who delight in lies for their own sake may be thought utterly ridiculous 
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(pangeloioi, Philopseudes 4). Mythos is made synonymous with pseusmata. Socrates 
uses mythos to clarify philosophical definitions, and rhetoric is useful and necessary 
too, so long as there is a greater goal in mind. By activating these terms, especially 
psychogōgia, to pseudos and to terpnon, charged as they are with literary pedigree, 
Lucian has opened up a space for re-negotiation of their function.  
If mythos is the same as lying, as the Lucianic parallels and the approximation 
in the VH preface show, and if Lucian’s mythologizing in his narrative here is 
premised on the fact that it is all false, then Socrates’ own mythologizing, by 
extension, is an act of lying, according to Lucian’s own representation of how he 
understands mythos’ function. Yet Plato uses myth in the mouth of Socrates to lead 
the reader, symbolized in Socrates’ interlocutor, to a certain truth. This is seen 
especially in the Phaedrus: Phaedrus asks Socrates if he believes that the myth about 
Boreas to be true (229c5: σὺ τοῦτο τὸ µυθολόγηµα πείθῃ ἀληθὲς εἶναι;). Socrates’ 
answer is far from clear: he does not dismiss the value of myths, especially if as 
analogy they may tell one about oneself, and this is what he himself needs above all, 
as he does not yet know himself (229c6-230a6). For Plato myth has a function, like 
the psychagōgia of rhetoric, namely to lead the soul to the truth (about itself).79 If we 
take the analogy from the Phaedrus, then Lucian’s True Stories and the lies told in 
them can draw the reader to a truth too, namely, in a circular motion back to the 
preface and its statement at the end that all that follows is false, and that there is no 
truth to be found therein.  
Lucian’s collapse of the Socratic paradigm set forth in the Phaedrus, and then 
re-voiced in the Apology, can be demonstrated in figure. 
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 1. TRUTH à 2. RHETORIC à 3. DECEPTION/LIES 
 
 
Lucian’s paradigm of truth and the function of rhetoric is to remove truth per 
se: if Lucian’s truth is lies, then one extremity of the Socratic spectrum, deception, is 
the same as the other extremity of the spectrum, namely, truth.80 The apparent 
security of the Verae Historiae is the preface, but Lucian carefully and subtly rules 
out real truth through the Platonic overtures which Lucian includes within the preface, 
and thus creates a circularity of argumentation. Following the Phaedran analogy, a 
baseline of truth upon which the lies of the main narrative can be set does not 
necessarily pertain, and thus Lucian, in the preface, manages to subvert the very use 
that Plato has his Socrates allot to rhetoric: a leading to the truth.81 As Lucian imparts 
no real truth, his psychagōgia is ψιλήν (1.2), and interpretation lies, fundamentally, 
open. Lucian appropriates the Phaedrus and Apology to prove that language can be 
deployed to lead the readers in a direction, but the destination is never reached, as it is 
unattainable if sought.82 
 
Homer’s Narrators and Interpreters in the Netherworld 
 
I would like to prove the argument I have set out for the preface, namely that of the 
removal of truth from Lucian’s “true” preface, by referring to a key episode in book 2 
of the True Stories. I will examine Lucian’s representation of narration, authorship 
and identity in the interview with Homer at 2.20, and in particular the revelation of 
the narrator’s name, for the first time in the main narrative, in Homer’s epigram at 
2.28. I will examine the correlation implied by Odysseus as storyteller outside the 
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control of his creator, Homer, and Lucian the actor-narrator of the main narrative, and 
highlight the disconnection between author and narrator. 
 At 2.20, after a few days sojourn in the Isles of the Blessed, the narrator 
finally plucks up the courage to speak with Homer.83 It is almost as though he has 
been patiently fulfilling a Phaeacian-like wait of xenia before asking the poetic 
archetype of his origins (he waits two or three days). This “where are you from” 
question which acts as a polite introductory disguises the profound importance and 
symbolism of the question, since it is one of the most vexed of the Homeric questions 
of antiquity. Lucian manipulates tradition by claiming Homer for himself, as a 
Babylonian birth-location (Homer’s answer) puts Homer firmly in his part of the 
world.84 In this fantasy locus, in which the narrator has the burden of Homeric 
scholarship to reckon with in his privileged meeting with Homer, the questions are the 
obvious: did Homer write the Iliad after the Odyssey,85 and did he write the lines 
which Zenodotus and Aristarchus claimed should be excluded.86 Lucian’s Homer fails 
to live up to the constructions of Alexandria, but it is interesting to note that the 
narrator fails to question Homer about the poem itself, except for the question about 
the first word of the poem, mēnis.87  Homer states that the idea came to him 
haphazardly, unintentionally: οὕτως ἐπελθεῖν αὑτῷ µηδὲν ἐπιτηδεύσαντι (2.20, “It 
just came to me, although I had not purposefully thought it up”). The overriding 
theme of the Iliad was an accident. By highlighting the essential thematic aspects of 
the Iliad only to remove authorial control and impetus, Lucian undermines the 
dominance of Homer behind the system of interpretation, just as Lucian’s narrator 
broached the famed questions of antiquity only to show how pointless these questions 
were.88 Similarly, the raising and then undermining of the truth in the preface reflects 
the recusal of Lucian from responsibility over his narrative (and preface).89 
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 Where, then, does control in interpretation lie? Is the author really sidelined? 
There is a traditional answer. Even in his post-mortem existence in the Isles of the 
Blessed, Homer still relies on the Muses for his craft. After the Homeric heroes (along 
with Socrates) defeat those who had broken out of the Isles of the Damned, Homer 
composes a poem celebrating the battle, which begins (2.24): νῦν δέ µοι ἔννεπε, 
Μοῦσα, µάχην νεκύων ἡρώων (“Tell me now, Muse, of the battle of the heroes who 
are corpses”). Authority still, it seems, comes from the Muses. Despite Homer’s 
confession of his modus operandi, namely that things just come to him, he still 
invokes the Muse to help him describe the battle of those in the Isles of the Blessed. 
There are at least two ways of interpreting this invocation. His opening is carefully 
constructed against the epic tradition he himself created, and within which he, too, is 
now caught. ἔννεπε points to the first line of the Odyssey, while the heroes as corpses 
recalls lines 3-4 of the Iliad’s proem (ἡρώων too used at the beginning of Iliad 1.4). 
The Iliadic allusion to the many souls of the heroes which the wrath of Achilles sent 
down to Hades, becomes concretely reality as Homer now sings of their exploits 
there. These heroes are in the Netherworld, in a sense, because Homer put them there: 
now he may continue the story, but against set epic-parameters. There is, after Homer, 
no such thing as separation from tradition, or pure originality,90 as Lucian’s preface 
itself shows: the inevitable literary inheritance of Lucian’s post-Classical stance 
catches this Kaizerzeitlicher Homer too. Homer is responding to Homer, and can only 
thus write.91 The Muse is, therefore, a signifier of creativity, but only through literary 
tradition, as Homer’s new epic line proves: from his original epic creations onwards, 
Muse-invocation is first and foremost an invocation of Homer and his Muse-
inspirations. The Muse has become little more than a metaphor of tradition.92 
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 The Muse invocation also points to a hierarchy of authority. In conjunction 
with the openings of the first Homeric poems, the Muses stand too as metaphors for 
the creative process, for “it just came to me” of Homer in Lucian. Thus there is 
always a disavowal of responsibility to a higher authority. But Lucian, in the preface, 
shows that the natural readerly reaction to look for meanings and solutions in an 
original authoritative setting, as his actor-narrator persona here attempts to do, is an 
erroneous interpretative choice. In the same way, were we to look beyond Lucian’s 
lies in his main narrative for truth, including his claims to truth in the preface, we 
would be disappointed. All the reader has to work with, in the end, are the texts 
themselves, with the umbilical cord to authors, or a sense of real, retrievable truth, 
cut. Even a fantasy meeting with Homer is of no use. Lucian, by means of this 
Homeric episode, can silence the pointless questions of antiquity and point to the 
inherent, reader-situated interpretations that matter – interpretations for which the 
author, Homer, can be of no help.93 We are to interpret texts as we will, including, in 
the case of the True Stories, the interpretative preface. 
 
Lucian, “Lucian” and Odysseus 
 
Lucian, especially in the Verae Historiae, situates a great deal of creative 
responsibility at the door of the narrator, as opposed to author.94 The narrator is an 
easy target for lies, and traditionally was seen as separate from the author. For 
example, the scholia on the Ares and Aphrodite episode in Odyssey 8 differentiated 
between Homer and Demodocus, and excused the bard for the aprepon nature of the 
story as he himself was not responsible for the words of Demodocus.95 Just so does 
Lucian posit Odysseus the narrator as Odysseus the inventor of lies in his narration in 
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Odyssey 9-12. Building within a tradition, post-Alexandria, of rescuing Homer from 
any censure for the representations in his poetry, Lucian calls Odysseus the leader and 
teacher of lies. 
 
ἀρχηγὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διδάσκαλος τῆς τοιαύτης βωµολοχίας ὁ τοῦ Ὁµήρου 
Ὀδυσσεύς, τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀλκίνουν διηγούµενος ἀνέµων τε δουλείαν καὶ 
µονοφθάλµους καὶ ὠµοφάγους καὶ ἀγρίους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους, ἔτι δὲ 
πολυκέφαλα ζῷα καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ φαρµάκων τῶν ἑταίρων µεταβολάς, οἷς πολλὰ 
ἐκεῖνος πρὸς ἰδιώτας ἀνθρώπους τοὺς Φαίακας ἐτερατεύσατο. 
Their leader and teacher in this tomfoolery is Homer’s Odysseus, who narrates 
to Alcinous and his court the tales of captive winds and one-eyed men and 
flesh-eating men, and wild men, and still yet many headed beings and the 
transformations of his companions by drugs – so much did he beguile those 
simple-minded Phaeacians with those tall tales. 
 
Lucian makes a clear demarcation between Homer and Odysseus.96 Odysseus is 
Homer’s but Odysseus is the archēgos and didaskalos himself of the bōmolochia.97 
Some commentators have seen this author-narrator and actor-narrator distinction 
mimicked in the Verae Historiae,98 and it is a model I have followed loosely in this 
article in terms of distinguishing between the two shades of Lucians, that of the 
preface, and that of the main narrative.99 There is no doubt that the voice of the 
narrator in the preface differs from that of the narrator in the main narrative, in terms 
of discourse. Yet I would prefer to identify the levels of responsibility in the two 
versions of the narrator as belonging to the same persona, not as an extradiegetic 
author in the preface preparing the way for the main narrative with its intradiegetic 
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narrator, but rather as two registers of the one and the same homodiegetic narrator in 
both preface and main narrative.100 As a number of studies have shown, until the Isles 
of the Blessed episode the narrator of the main narrative is never named, and this 
anonymity seems to create a distance between the seemingly truthful narrator of the 
preface and the unceasingly lying counterpart of the main tale.101 There are two 
indications which suggest a more nuanced interpretation of the two narrators is 
needed. There is, first, a strong link between both narratives at the very beginning of 
the main section of the Verae Historiae (1.5):  
 
ὁρµηθεὶς γάρ ποτε ἀπὸ Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν καὶ ἀφεὶς εἰς τὸν ἑσπέριον 
ὠκεανὸν οὐρίῳ ἀνέµῳ τὸν πλοῦν ἐποιούµην. αἰτία δέ µοι τῆς ἀποδηµίας καὶ 
ὑπόθεσις ἡ τῆς διανοίας περιεργία καὶ πραγµάτων καινῶν ἐπιθυµία. 
For starting out from the pillars of Heracles and pushing out to the western 
ocean with a following wind, I made my voyage. The cause and purpose of 
my excursion abroad was curiosity of thought and a desire for new things. 
 
The “ego” of the main narrative is inextricably linked with the preface by gar. The 
beginnings of this voyage are set in discourse with the preface, and answer the 
implied why set forth in the preface.102 The vocabulary for the reason for setting out 
on this voyage mimics the details of the preface, too. Hypothesis, dianoia and kainōn 
are all found in the preface.103 Novelty and curiosity of mind match the novelty of 
subject matter and the entertainment of the mind promised in the preface, and 
although the register of the narration has altered from discursive to pragmatic, the 
links and seams are clear. The “I” transgresses both narrative elements, yet the same 
“I” competes within those elements, as the first explicitly states that all that follows is 
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false, while the second points to the veracity of all of his lies.104 There is thus a 
tension between the two registers of the same persona, as both invite interpretation 
and exert control over the act of reading.105 
 The identity of the narrator of the main narrative is revealed, at 2.28, as 
Lucian, the author.106 When it comes to the point that the narrator must leave the Isles 
of the Blessed, Homer writes an epigram for him (2.28):107 
 
τὸ δὲ ἐπίγραµµα ἦν τοιόνδε: 
Λουκιανὸς τάδε πάντα φίλος µακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν 
εἶδέ τε καὶ πάλιν ἦλθε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν. 
And the epigram was as follows: 
Lucian, dear to the blessed gods, saw all of the things and made it back to his 
beloved homeland. 
 
Finally, the identity of the narrator is revealed, and given the signs in the preface 
about what would follow, it comes as no surprise. The naming of the narrator brings 
Lucian into the fictional arena which he has created.108 He too now lives in this 
fantasy-discourse, and, therefore, any interpretative or literary discussion is brought 
back to the outer most level of the narrative structure: what guise does Lucian assume 
in the preface? This epigram holds the answer. Lucian, because of this epigram, is 
now the creation of Homer. Homer assumes control of the plot from this point 
onwards, as he foregrounds a happy end to the adventure. He creates a nostos for this 
new Odyssean Lucian, in the narrative compressed into the two lines of the epigram. 
In the declaration that Lucian returned (past tense: πάλιν ἦλθε) to his native land, 
control over his own narrative has been wrested from Lucian the narrator, and a 
Truth,	  Narration,	  and	  Interpretation	  in	  Lucian’s	  Verae	  Historiae	  
	   25	  
delimitation has been set on the story, with the number of potential outcomes and 
false foreshadowings diminished.109 We are led to expect an Odyssean continuation of 
the story, a prolepsis of an ultimately happy and safe return home. Lucian is now 
inscribed in hexameters, and the Odyssean adventure, the key influence on the text 
and one repeatedly and explicitly pointed to, is finally given a true Homeric 
authority.110 
 Lucian’s transference of responsibility to Homer can be re-read into the 
preface. Lucian promotes Odysseus as the leader of lies in his narration to the 
Phaeacians. At the end of Odyssey 8 Alcinous asks Odysseus to name himself, and to 
tell of his adventures. Odysseus, at the beginning of book 9, prefaces his narration by 
first emphasising the delight he takes in symposiastic occasions (9.2-11), in the 
possibility to hear a bard (9.3-4, 7-8), but then foregrounds his own tale which he will 
narrate by hinting at the sufferings he has undergone (9.12-18), and by his revealing 
his identity (9.19-36), all in a manner which mimics the very information given in the 
Odyssey’s proem.111 He then begins his tale by describing how he set out from Troy, a 
wind driving him to Ismaros (9.39-40). This is just how the opening of the main 
narration of Lucian’s tale begins, with a description of the favourable wind as they 
left the pillars of Heracles. Odysseus’ preface and his narration of his travels, of his 
reflections on song and his own troubles, before embarking on his own song, is a 
model for Lucian’s preface on the nature of truth and lies in narration, and the main 
narrative which then follows it. This idea is cemented in this epigram, as the Lucianic 
identity of the narrator is merged with that of Homer’s own Odysseus. This is one and 
the same Lucian as the narrator, speaking to a readership which mimics the 
Phaeacians, but with one key difference: we are to be less gullible, as Lucian has 
forewarned us.112  
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This persona, creation of Homer, is used too by Socrates in Republic book 10 
and the myth of Er. At Resp. 614af Socrates states that he will tell of Er, a story not 
like that told to Alcinous (by Odysseus). The scholia to Lucian see in 1.4, where 
Lucian states that even philosophers told lies, a connection with Socrates’ statement 
in the Republic.113 As Ní Mheallaigh has proven, the advertisement of unlikeness 
encourages the reader, nevertheless, to compare Socrates’ version with that of 
Odysseus, and therefore advertises the underlying fictionality of Socrates’ tale.114 
Lucian has gone one step further and has appropriated both a Socratic voice, as I 
discussed above, and an Odyssean voice, and by so doing has responded to Socrates’ 
distancing from Odysseus, by synonymising their accounts. On a yet further level of 
reading, Lucian’s statement of truth, that he will tell no truth, is set within a 
framework of two voices whose narrations famously beggar belief. Lucian’s 
insistance that only he is truthful is undermined by the very voices he chooses to 
project this statement. Thus, Lucian the author inscribes a version of himself in both 
the preface and main narrative, an identity which resembles but masks the author 
lying behind – no different from Plato’s use of Socrates – or Odysseus, a bard-figure 
who sings his tales, within Homer’s Odyssey. 
 The veracity of Lucian’s account is given Homeric authority as a result of this 
epigram. It declares that Lucian saw all of these things we learn from his narration, 
that is, the journey, the meeting with all of the characters and the meeting with Homer 
himself. By allowing Homer to ascribe truth-value to the completely untrue, Lucian 
bestows upon his text the ultimate seal of validation, given that, in antiquity, Homer 
was largely beyond reproach.115 He also, however, challenges the very reverence with 
which the Homeric texts are received, given the emphasis Lucian places on his 
untruthfulness. Lucian has become a creation of Homer, and in this guise as an 
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Odyssean teller of tales who cannot be trusted, he calls into question his creator and 
the control he can exert over any text, even this epigram. The lack of ending to the 
Verae Historiae, and the denial of a narration of a successful nostos, further 
undermines the plot which Homer now ascribes to Lucian’s journey. Once again, no 
plot, even Homer’s, is unbreakable.116 
 Homer’s Netherworld poetic constructions are once again created with the 
original Homeric epics as hypotexts. His epigram contains a Homeric intertext from 
Odyssey 1, where Odysseus’ nostos is the subject of Athena’s speech. She states, at 
Odyssey 1.82-3: 
 
εἰ µὲν δὴ νῦν τοῦτο φίλον µακάρεσσι θεοῖσι, 
νοστῆσαι Ὀδυσῆα πολύφρονα ὅνδε δόµονδε. 
If now this is dear to the gods, that shrewd Odysseus return to his home. 
 
Line 82 is especially noteworthy: φίλον µακάρεσσι θεοῖσι occurs only here in the 
Homeric corpus, but recurs in Homer’s new work, his epigram for Lucian. Athena 
argues that Odysseus should get a nostos, and that Hermes should be dispatched to 
prise him out of the hands of Calypso. The original Odysseus gets his nostos, and 
Homer’s new Odysseus, Lucian, will get his too, if we are to go on this intertext. 
Through this literary a fortiori example, we are inclined to trust him. Homer cements 
the notion that this Lucian is an Odysseus figure; by extension the readers of Lucian’s 
work, as fore-warned Phaeacians, have been subjected to Lucian’s hyper-Odyssey, 
with tales in their nature beyond anything found in the original Odyssey account of 
Odysseus. The circumstances, however, between the two Odysseus-es, Lucian the 
new Odysseus and actual Odysseus, are opposite: death has changed perspectives. In 
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the Odyssey, Odysseus was to travel away from Ogygia. Now Lucian is to travel to 
Ogygia (2.27). Odysseus chose Penelope over immortal life. Now in the Netherworld 
Odysseus changes his mind, in realization of his mistake (2.35-6). His replacement, 
Lucian as the new Odysseus the text promotes, is to deliver news of this change of 
mind by handing over a letter to Calypso, without the knowledge of Penelope (or 
Homer) (2.29). Odysseus can create and manipulate literary history, and he can do so 
without the author knowing. Homeric tradition is thus re-written, and Lucian’s role in 
this reversal is key. Homeric authority and tradition are subverted by one of Homer’s 
own characters, and tradition, as such, is shown as unstable. Homer’s proleptic 
narrative about Lucian inscribed in the epigram becomes, therefore, all the more 
unstable, and the promise of a happy ending for this new Odysseus is put in doubt. 
 
Homer undone 
 
By putting Homer, and Homeric criticism, within the Isles of the Blessed, Lucian, as 
Kim has shown, presents Homeric poetry as occupying a space cut off from the 
world.117 Lucian’s literary, post-Classical world appropriates the past in person, and 
interrogates him. Lykinus, at the beginning of Lucian’s Hesiod, points out to his 
interlocutor Hesiod that he, Hesiod, is indeed the best poet as his own poems prove 
this. He adds (1): “And we believe these things are so.”118 The narrator then goes on 
to undermine this trust in Hesiod by displaying the shortcomings of his work. In that 
dialogue the implicit reliance upon the author is raised right from the beginning, and 
Lykinus as a sort of ideal reader wants answers: why does Hesiod not fulfill his 
promises in his poetry. In the Verae Historiae, the situation is similar but much more 
complex. Lucian on one level glorifies Homer and satirizes the scholars of Homeric 
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poetry. Their reading was wrong, but the common-sense answers, the ones we really 
want, are the ones Homer gives. In that sense the historical identity of Homer rescues 
a non-scholastic approach to poetry. But on another level Homeric authority itself is 
undermined. He came up with the key theme of the Iliad unintentionally; the athetized 
lines are all his – including lines that really do not make sense in their contexts; his 
own Odysseus answers the calls of the Homeric critics by choosing eternal life over 
Penelope after all, and so overcomes the original Homeric plot that was laid upon 
him.119 Moreover, Homer validates the narration of this Lucian, whom we know to be 
telling lies. He attempts to guarantee Lucian’s nostos, basing his construction on the 
nostos of Odysseus which he wrote, but which is now un-written by Odysseus.  
Homer is caught within a web of creations which construct Lucian’s work, and 
Lucian himself. It is not just the case that Lucian’s narrators (and by analogy Socrates 
and Odysseus) present slippery narrations, straining to receive the belief of their 
narratees despite the warnings of the preface; the historical authors too (Homer, Plato, 
Lucian) cannot be trusted, and in fact they have no idea what they are creating. In the 
hierarchy of belief, the author comes at the bottom, like the truth promoted implicitly 
in the Phaedran and Apologian intertexts of the preface, and the separated narrators, 
the constructed Odysseus-es have a degree of control and authorship, of manipulation, 
that the author par excellence, Homer and the philosopher par excellence raised in the 
preface, Socrates, do not have. This freedom to revert tradition, to destabilize 
authority, is inscribed already in Lucian’s preface. He leaves the reader, specifically 
those falling in with the narrative (ἐντυχάνοντας), with the paratextual advice in the 
last sentence of his preface, to believe nothing that follows (1.4). We, the readers 
hailed in the opening of the preface, in our very participation, must decide whether 
the factors truth, and in that relation, trust, so advertised by Lucian in his authorial, 
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prefatory voice, actually mask the real task of the text’s recipients: to challenge and to 
rewrite the very narrative Lucian presents. Lucian the actor-narrator meets Homer to 
receive answers: his Homer is a construction of traditions, one who could have come 
from Smyrna or Chios as well as Babylon, one who could have verified the critique of 
those Alexandrian scholars, simply because he is constructed, nothing more than a 
symbol of a never-ending search for identity and solutions. Lucian constructs his very 
own narrative-identity in similar fashion. We never come to any demonstrably 
verifiable solution to the conundrums Lucian’s own True Stories fabricate. Thus, the 
fluidity of identity is symbolized too in the un-ended state of the narrative: the search 
has no telos,120 and Lucian’s open-ended journey through ever-increasingly surreal 
locations is mimicked by the ideal type of reading which Lucian’s narrative elicits, 
one which is anti-teleological.   
In the complex circularity of narration in the True Stories, Lucian, eventually 
named by Homer in the epigram, is both the historical author of the work, and 
synonymous with the narrator of the preface and main narrative. He is a Homer 
undermined by his narrators, in the guise at once of Socrates discoursing on truth and 
rhetoric, and then the ever-fluctuating persona of Odysseus. Lucian cannot control 
how we read his text, but he can try to manipulate our reading if we take the preface 
at face value. Rightly read, this text reneges upon responsibility. As Ní Mheallaigh 
has shown,121 the abrupt ending to the narrative, when put into contact with the 
closural prolepsis which Homer gives the tale, in a sense makes the text fragmentary 
itself, an artifact which awaits discovery and analysis, having the more authentic 
status of a pseudo-document. It is almost as though, one day, Lucian himself will be 
asked: why did you end where you did? And he will answer just as his Homer did. 
But such a question would miss the underlying potential of the text. 
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1 I use story as a translation of the Greek title διηγηµάτων. The term signifies simply 
“fictional narrative”, rather than historical account as such. See Georgiadou and 
Larmour (1998), 1 n. 1 and Kim (2010), 141 n. 6. I will not discuss the 
historiographical nature of the preface. See, instead, Georgiadou and Larmour (1998), 
28-40, 58, and throughout their commentary. All translation in this article is my own, 
unless otherwise stated. 
2 Excellent discussion of the preface can be found in von Möllendorff (2000), 30-61, 
as well as Georgiadou and Larmour (1998) 51-9 and in their introduction, among 
other studies (see the bibliography in Ní Mheallaigh (2005a) as well as her own 
discussion of the preface in Ní Mheallaigh (2005a) and Ní Mheallaigh (2009)). 
3 For which see McCoy (2007), 2-7 for the seeming polarity in Plato and its 
significances.  
4 On which, see above all von Möllendorff (2000), 525-34, and also the bibliography 
and discussion at von Möllendorff (2014), 529. 
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5 The preface is not the only locus for these debates: Lucian’s Cloud Cuckoo-Land at 
1.29 and the stop-off at Ogygia (2.35-6) re-open these issues, given the charged meta-
poetical content of those episodes, because of the original texts which they allude to 
and manipulate (Aristophanes’ Clouds and Homer’s Odyssey book 5 respectively). 
See von Möllendorff (2000), 452-3, in particular.  
6 On the preface as an instrument of authorial control, see Genette (1997), 222. 
7 Above all Ní Mheallaigh (2009). 
8 The Greek text (throughout) is taken from the edition of Macleod (1972). This latter 
statement is closely modeled on Socrates’ own in the Apology (21d). For the parallel, 
see Georgiadou and Larmour (1998), 1-2, and Ní Mheallaigh (2005a), 116-50, in 
addition to my discussion below. 
9 On which see von Möllendorff (2000), 17-18. 
10 Following the definition of LSJ s.v. χαρίεις II 2. 
11 On the adjective psilos, Lucian’s Peregrinus 39.14 is of particular note: there it is 
stated that a man of taste (that is, properly educated) gets facts without embellishment 
(psilos), but to those βλᾶκας (uneducated) one must thicken the plot (ἐτραγῴδουν). 
Lucian’s VH is for the educated. 
12 Cf. Nünlist (2009), 144, on the term in the Homeric scholia, where it is used 
principally as a synonym for hēdonē. Cf. too Hillgruber (1994), 93. The verbal form 
is found twice in Aristotle Poetics (1450a33-35 and 1450b16-20): the first reference 
refers to the emotional effects of tragic performance, and the latter to spectacle in 
tragedy – the psychagōgia has nothing to do with the poetry, but rather all to do with 
the costumes. Lucian, in the preface, emphasizes the effect of the language and 
content of his work to transport readers. 
13 On the parallelism, see von Möllendorff (2000), 37. 
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14 At Achilles Tatius 2.35 the narrator Cleitophon embarks on something very similar: 
his sea-companions are undergoing grief at recent events, and so he decides to tell a 
logos which has erotic psychagōgia. This para-narrative (which includes the 
interlocutions of Clitophon’s companion, Menelaus) is both a formal synkrisis, a 
display of rhetoric and paideia on a common novelistic theme, eros, but one which 
behaves as mise-en-abîme of the narrative action and themes which surround it (and 
so behaves not dissimilarly to Lucian’s preface). Clitophon’s retort to Menelaus at 
2.37 clearly points back to the Europa ecphrasis of Ach.Tat. 1.1, and acts, therefore, 
as an exposition. Cf. the incisive discussion of Goldhill (1995), 81-94, and esp. 81-2. 
Importantly for my discussion, the narrative of both speakers at 2.35-7 mimic the 
discussions on Eros in both Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus, the latter especially so, 
given the use at the beginning of psychagōgia. 
15  Cf. VH 1.2, discussed above: τὸ ξένον τῆς ὑποθέσεως οὐδὲ τὸ χαρίεν τῆς 
προαιρέσεως. 
16 At Zeuxis 5, it is the multifaceted manner in which Zeuxis has produced his work, 
rather than the subject itself or its novelty, that is praiseworthy. Lucian uses the same 
word for variety in composition at VH 1.2: the lies are poikila, just as Zeuxis has 
displayed his skill poikilōs. On the adverb at Zeuxis 5 and its significance, see von 
Möllendorff (2006), 76-7. 
17 Σ bT, on ἀνδράσι Πυγµαίοισι, Il. 3.6: καὶ τῷ ξένῳ τῆς ἱστορίας ψυχαγωγεῖ καὶ τὸν 
θροῦν αὔξει. 
18 See especially Dionysus 5 and 8 (on literary novelty and reader’s expectations), Bis 
Accusatus 33 (Lucian’s work as a mix of old comedy, invective and cynicism) and 
Prometheus Es 5 (Lucian’s originality consists in his blending of Socratic dialogue 
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form and comedy, but the seams of each genre should show). On Lucian’s aesthetic 
self-representation, see, above all, von Möllendorff (2006), esp. 65-7 and 79-83. 
19 On the reliability of the preface’s narrator, see, further, my discussion at pp. 21-3. 
See too Whitmarsh (2013), 63-74 for a more nuanced (anti-narratological) approach. 
20 See, above all, Dio Chrys. 32.5 (he associates the term with theatre, and as the 
opposite of spoudaios), and Strabo 1.1.10, 1.2.3.36 and 1.2.3.38, with the discussion 
of von Möllendorff (2000), 43-5, Kim (2010), 62-3 and especially Ní Mheallaigh 
(2005a), 139-153. Ní Mheallaigh in particular shows how the Strabean intertexts add 
to Lucian’s meta-commentary of the value of fiction versus truth. 
21 “Nor is it true what Eratosthenes says, that every poet aims at entertainment, not 
instruction.” 
22 Kim (2010), 149 n. 35, whose translation I borrow. 
23 In the second sentence of the 2nd century (C.E.) treatise on rhetoric Ars Rhetorica 
by ps.-Dionysius we find a similar formulation that psychagōgia is a constituent part 
of festivals put on by cities to help facilitate relaxation from life’s labours. For the 
date of the treatise, see Heath (2004), 129-30. 
24 Laird (2003), 18 points out the neglect this term here in the VH has suffered in 
scholarship, but omits further discussion himself. See the brief excursus in von 
Möllendorff (2000), 39-42.  
25 For further discussion and definition of metalepsis, see, principally, de Jong (2009), 
esp. 89-90, and for this section of the VH preface as metaleptic, see, most recently, 
von Möllendorff (2013), 368-9. I use meta-commentary here simply for the reason 
that it is one remove away from the explicit debate here in the preface – the discussion 
of truth and lies belongs to a tradition of previous debates on the topic, and therefore 
the reader is bound to posit this debate within the history of such debates. 
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26 For the idea of high vantage point and the world as a spectacle, or hotchpotch, see 
Icaromenippus 16 and Pan’s amusement from his vantage point at Bis Accusatus 
10.18. Cf. the discussion of Whitmarsh (2001), 257-65. 
27 On the importance of philosophy for the preface and the VH as a whole, see 
Georgiadou and Larmour (1998), esp. 13-22 and 40-4. See also Laird (2003), von 
Möllendorff (2000), 544-62 and above all Ni Mheallaigh (2005a), 118-53 and 
(2005b), 96-9, among others. Laird (2003) and Ni Mheallaigh (2005b) concentrate, in 
particular, on the representation of philosophy and philosophers in the Isles of the 
Blessed. On Lucian and Plato generally, see Branham (1989), 67-123. 
28 Laws 727a7-b3, following von Möllendorff (2000), 36-8. 
29 On the readership, see Whitmarsh (2006), 112. On the athletic comparison, see, 
above all, von Möllendorff (2000), 36-8, and cf. Georgiadou and Larmour (1998), 52 
for a list of authors who use an athletic analogy to illustrate a conceptual point. 
30 Whitmarsh (2001), 247-93 with reference in particular to Nigrinus, Philopseudes 
and the Piscator shows the danger of seeking “true utterances” in Lucian’s works, as 
the multiple personae purportedly representative of Lucian the author elude 
approximation. On the reader’s cooperation in activating historical philosophical 
debate, see Schlapbach (2010), and esp. 251-2: “By emphasizing the recipient’s active 
involvement in the creation of sense, Lucian points to the limitations of established 
types of philosophical discourse.” 
31 On the background to these statements, see Reeve (1989), 10-14 and 28-32; see, 
too, the discussion of Slings (1994), 27-8. 
32 See Reeve (1989), 5-6 on this statement. Cf. Ní Mhellaigh (2005a), 120: “By 
presenting himself subsequently as a guileless, plain-speaking man who knows 
nothing, Socrates, by this logic, implies that he is truthful.” 
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33 Ní Mhellaigh (2005a), 120-1. 
34 Ní Mhellaigh (2005a), 121, on VH 2.17-20 and Ap. 41a-c. 
35 Most strongly put in the Apology at 17b7-8: only Socrates tells the truth, not his 
detractors.  
36 As Reeve (1989), 5 states, Socrates is clearly a clever speaker, but of a type 
(according to Reeve) somewhat different to the sophists who spin rhetoric to deceive. 
37 Cf. von Möllendorff (2000), 555 (with Ní Mheallaigh (2005a), 127-8) on the 
lebenswert value of lies in the VH, as a parallel to the Phaedo (esp. 114d6). 
38 VH 1.2. 
39 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the many facets of ᾔνικται (1.2). The 
best discussion is still Georgiadou and Larmour (1998), 5-6 and 22-44. They state 
(23) that its conjunction with Lucian’s coinage ἀκωµῳδήτως implies that parody is 
the verb’s key signification. See, too, von Möllendorff (2000), 44-5, 48-56 and 567-8. 
On parody as a form of meta-fiction, and for a history of its development, see, above 
all, Rose (1993), 1-39. 
40 For bibliography on the Apology, and especially its opening (pseudo-) prooemium 
as a parody of the rhetoric he so condemned, see Brickhouse and Smith (1986), 289-
98. On Socrates’ philosophical rhetoric and the significance of the oracle and his 
mission, see Metcalf (2004). On Socrates’ irony in this connection, cf. Vlastos (1985), 
3-9. 
41  In the Apology, Socrates promises “that he will subordinate a rhetoric of 
nonrational persuasion to a rhetoric of truth-telling” (so Reeve (1989), 6), which is 
essentially too what Lucian argues as to how he differs from the “others”. 
42 At a yet further remove, Socrates is expressing his ignorance in response to the 
original oracle which proclaimed his wisdom: through this statement, Socrates 
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implicitly points to the invalidity of the oracle as a higher truth; Lucian, in turn, is 
answering Socrates, but the reader in each case is to doubt the validity of ex cathedra 
pronouncements. On the Socratic distancing from the oracle, see West (1979) 106-7. 
43 That this adverb signifies the stage of Old Comedy has been demonstrated beyond 
doubt by von Möllendorff (2000), 49-50, following Fredericks (1976), 56-7. The 
latter is correct to see in the explicit praise of Aristophanes by the narrator of the main 
narrative (1.29) a hint that it is Aristophanes whom we should principally have in 
mind with this adverb in the preface. The metaphor of the stage makes even more 
sense when one takes into account Aelius Aristides’ treatise Concerning the 
Prohibition of Comedy 29.21 (Behr). A teacher ought not to go to the theatre as it is 
dedicated to hēdonē and psychagōgia. 
44 Schol. Ar. Av. 1553f. rightly see in the place name an allusion to philosophers who 
walk in shadow. 
45 Dunbar (1998), 485-6 sees too a possible allusion to Aeschylus’ play Psychagōgoi. 
46 Cf. Schol. Ar. Av. 1555b, who define the verb as referring to Socrates’ teaching of 
souls, or his leading them. 
47 See Dunbar (1998), 486 for further discussion. 
48 The best discussion of Socrates in Aristophanes is still Dover (1968), xxxii-lvii. 
49 In my discussion of Odysseus, below, I connect all three narratorial frames, Lucian 
and “Lucian”, Plato and Socrates, and Homer and Odysseus. On the famous problem 
of Socrates as representative or non-representative of the historical Plato’s 
philosophy, see, most recently, Schulz (2013), 4-7 (and 1-16 on Plato’s methods of 
embedding or hiding his own philosophical conceptions through or behind the 
Socratic voice).  
50 Cf. Dover (1968), xlv. 
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51  On Lucian’s use of Aristophanes generally, especially in the VH, see von 
Möllendorff (2000), 193-205. 
52 On which, see Reeve (1989), 10. I am not suggesting that Plato’s Socrates is uni-
faceted or non-slippery; the Aristophanic intertext makes explicit that it is the slippery 
persona of Socrates that Lucian promotes. 
53 Gorgias 452e, where rhetoric is a means towards public persusasion: cf. Asmis 
(1986), 154. 
54 Phaedrus 261d10-e2. See the discussion of Asmis (1986), 154-5. 
55 Cf. Asmis (1986), 155: ‘Consequently, Socrates argues, since rhetoric is the 
practice of deception, and since deception cannot be successful unless the deceiver 
knows the truth, the rhetorician must have knowledge.’ Cf. McCoy (2007) 174-5 for a 
succinct but clear summary of Socrates’ exposition of the true usefulness of rhetoric.  
56 Cf. Asmis (1986), 157 on Phaedrus 271. Cf. Plutarch Pericles 15.2 for an emphasis 
on the power of rhetoric to lead souls to the desired point – Plutarch there cites this 
very Phaedran passage to illustrate the technē of rhetoric. 
57 For the importance of the Phaedrus in prose texts of the early imperial period, see 
Trapp (1990), and esp. the appendix at 170-3, and Ní Mheallaigh (2007). For a recent, 
careful, discussion of the myths used in the Phaedrus itself, see Cairns (2013). 
58 To an Athenian audience, of course, this location would not be exotic, but to both 
Socrates himself, and through literary tradition to Lucian and his readers, the location 
takes on a special, extra-ordinary significance. 
59 So too will a relaxation of the mind from more serious reading provide preparation 
for labour all the more intense (lit. thought more fully blooming, fit for labour), VH 
1.1: ἀκµαιοτέραν. LSJ s.v. ἀκµαῖος I 2 define the adjective as belonging to the 
“culmination of oratory”, citing Hermog. Id. 1.7 and Inv. 4.4, which makes the 
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Phaedran intertext all the more appropriate, that dialogue relating as it does the art of, 
chiefly, spoken rhetoric. 
60 I am following here the discussion of Asmis (1986), 159, where she states: “Acting 
as a “psychagogue”, [Socrates] associates Phaedrus with himself in a search for self-
knowledge, by guiding him to a holy place where Phaedrus may be healed of his evil 
[rhetorical] enchantment.” 
61 On the pillars of Heracles as the outer-limits of the world, see Strabo 3.5.5. 
62 Plato here is probably alluding to (and punning on) the famous dictum of Gorgias 
about the effect of language on the soul (Helen 10): αἱ γὰρ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπωιδαὶ 
ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγοὶ λύπης γίνονται (for the songs inspired through logoi are 
enticers of pleasure, dispellers of pain). On the parallels between this passage and 
Ach. Tat. 2.35 and Lucian VH 1.2, see Goldhill (1995), 82 (and 82 n. 69). 
63 On the symbolism of the language for journeys, paths, and guidance at the 
beginning of the Phaedrus, see Werner (2012), 20. 
64 The expression ἐκ τοῦ ἀστείου occurs only here. In the De Domo, Lucian also 
seems to enlarge as metaphors of style the physical features of the Phaedran setting, 
esp. at De Domo 4 and 5, and the close relation between the beautiful setting and the 
production of logos, in the sense that the former generates the latter, and is its original 
author. 
65 Similarly, Socrates states that rhetorical technē is psychagōgia through logoi 
(261a8, quoted above).  
66 On later uses of psychagōgia and its application as a term implying bewitchment, 
see Laird (1993), 170-1. Cf. too Apuleius Met. 1.1 on the bewitching effect on the 
ears promised by the narrative, in a preface which similarly insists on its novelty as 
well as truth-value.  
Truth,	  Narration,	  and	  Interpretation	  in	  Lucian’s	  Verae	  Historiae	  
	   44	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Πρὶν ἄν τις τό τε ἀληθὲς ἑκάστων εἰδῇ πέρι ὧν λέγει ἢ γράφει. 
68 Διὸ δεῖ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας µηδαµῶς πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς. 
69 Cal. 11: οὐδ' ἂν κατίσχυε τὴν πάντων ἰσχυροτέραν ἀλήθειαν, εἰ µὴ πολὺ τὸ 
ἐπαγωγὸν καὶ πιθανὸν καὶ µυρία ἄλλα παρεσκεύαστο κατὰ τῶν ἀκουόντων. 
70 See, especially, the Philopseudes and Vitarum auctio (passim.). 
71 The idea of bringing something forth (ekpherō) has a wide range of meanings, and 
is often used of bringing something out of darkness into the light, including the act of 
childbirth. Cf. esp. Plato Resp. 461c and Laws 788c. In the sense used by Lucian (and 
it is used in this form only here by him) it most likely signifies publication (of written 
work), similar to the sense used by Dion. Hal. at the beginning of his work on literary 
composition (Comp. 1). It is strategically placed to balance the verb of the next 
clause, ᾔνικται, the antithesis emphasized by the balancing ὅτι... ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι 
introductions. 
72 Cf. von Möllendorff (2000), 46. 
73 It is found elsewhere, before Lucian, only in [Longinus] Subl. 15.8 and Dion. Hal. 
De Im. fr. 31.5.1. 
74 Aristotle uses the term phantasia at Rhetoric 1404a11 to define lexis. Its definition 
there has been subject to varying interpretations, from “ostentation”, “mere show” to 
something pertaining closer to psychological function. For recent discussion, see 
González (2006). 
75 Strabo uses the term to describe the style of historians such as Herodotus and 
Ctesias who aim at a pleasing reception (Strabo 11.6.3): see Kim (2010), 148-9 for 
discussion, and on Lucian’s VH and Strabo, as well as the traditions of historiography, 
see Kim (2010), 144-50. 
76 See the discussion of Slings (1994), 28, on Apology 19. 
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77 Not that Socrates’ use of myth should be understood simply as a vehicle for 
philosophical thought (even that is argued against): see, principally, the discussion, 
with references, of Werner (2012), 9-15. 
78 The same emphasis is placed on to terpnon in De Domo 2 on the joy of beholding 
beauty, but only as a contrast to those who can respond to beauty with words. Longus 
famously sets up his work in opposition to Thucydides, by alluding to the latter’s 
ktēma es aiei (1.22) because it is aterpnoteron, with his own ktēma de terpnon for all 
(preface, 3). Goldhill (1995), 6-7 rightly sees Longus marking a ‘rhetorical self-
positioning with regard to what is a “focal point for historiographical dispute 
throughout the Hellenistic period” – the theoretical opposition between the 
“pleasurable” (and the “mythic”) on the one hand, and the “useful” (and the 
researched) on the other’. Goldhill (1995), 7 recalls too Gorgias’ rhetoric and its 
terpsis, which is surely central to Lucian’s presentation of his plausible lies. 
79 Cf. Werner (2012), 14: “Platonic myth serves as a means of capturing the attention 
of the appropriately disposed nonphilosophical reader (or listener), so as to draw him 
or her into the philosophical life. Such a use of myth is rooted in Plato’s view of the 
soul, and is closely related to his notion of ψυχαγωγία.” 
80 Cf. Ní Mheallaigh (2009), 12: “Lucian’s preface, therefore, playfully highlights the 
fallacy of the notion that the author’s intentions are reliably recoverable through the 
text.” 
81 Plato’s redeployment of argumentation about rhetoric in the mouth of Socrates is 
not entirely static, of course. Socrates’ new appropriation of rhetoric as a technē is 
only one facet of the many arguments on rhetoric and truth in the Phaedrus. 
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82  The fact that Lucian’s Odyssey-like adventure is open-ended reflects the 
proposition of the preface. On the meta-literary implications of the non-ending of the 
VH, see Baumbach (2013), passim.  
83 On this episode, see von Möllendorff (2000), 367-73, and most recently Kim 
(2010), 162-8, whose discussion I follow, in part, in this section. See, too, the succinct 
but lucid discussion of Ní Mheallaigh (2009), 23-7. 
84 On this, see Ní Mheallaigh (2009), 25-6 and Kim (2010), 164-5.  
85 VH 2.20 (cf. von Möllendorff (2000), 370-1). 
86 VH 2.20. 
87 2.20: on this question, see Kim (2010), 163. 
88 As pointed out already by Ní Mheallaigh (2009), 11: ‘The VH exposes the fallacy 
of the very idea of origins, and explores the dangers inherent in the cultural 
privileging of origins through intentionalist readings.’ 
89 Cf. Kim (2010), 164 on the pointlessness of investigating Homer’s poetic decisions. 
Lucian sometimes brings to light the inconsistencies in Homer’s texts: cf., e.g., 
Iuppiter Confutatus 1 and 2 on the inconsistencies in Homer’s portrayal of Zeus and 
Fate. 
90 Lucian’s Piscator shows most clearly the inevitability of imitation by setting much 
of that dialogue in Homeric cento. Cf., too, Prometheus Es 3 for the necessity of 
epigonality.  
91 Of course, this post-Homeric Homer writes, rather than sings or composes. 
92 The traditional interpretation of the Muses as figures to whom responsibility for 
composition and therefore quality and content can be shifted by the poet, is reflected 
too in Lucian’s short dialogue Hesiodus. In it, Lykinus challenges Hesiod about his 
unfulfilled claims to speak of the future (1-3). Hesiod deflects Lykinos’ criticisms to 
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the Muses (4; cf. 9), and the historical author is spared the charges of inaccuracy of 
falsehood which so obviously pertain to him. On the relationship between Muse and 
narrator, and the disavowal of responsibility, see Morrison (2007), 73-4. 
93 Cf. Ní Mheallaigh (2009), 25 on the Aristarchan fallacy (for Lucian) of elucidating 
Homer from Homer. 
94 On the instability of Lucian naming himself, see Goldhill (2002), 64-5. 
95 See schol. on Od. 8.267, with the discussion of Burkert (1960), 143 who himself 
compares the I-narration of Odysseus in books 9-12.  
96  In this fictional Netherworld the fictional characters overwhelm and control 
outcomes and even their creators, as Odysseus’ successful defence of Homer against 
Thersites proves (2.20). Cf. Ní Mheallaigh (2005a), 166 and (2009), 21. 
97 Cf. Kim (2010), 142-3. 
98 Above all Georgiadou and Larmour (1998), 59. On I-narrators in Lucian and the 
distinction of actor-narrator categories, see above all Saïd (1993), esp. 263-6. 
99 On the complexity and interaction of author- and actor- discourse, see Bal (1997), 
50-6. 
100 For these narratological labels, I follow Genette (1980) (see esp. 128).  
101 See the recent study of Kim (2010), 172-3 and above all Goldhill (2002), 65. 
Fields (2013), 214 n. 4, on Lucian as narrator and author of the text, notes that 
Lucianic texts ‘simultaneously [make] any conclusive identification impossible’ 
between author and narrator of the same name. 
102 On the function of gar here, see, above all, von Möllendorff (2000), 62 
103 Listed and discussed by von Möllendorff (2000), 64-5. 
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104 See, above all, the narrators insistence at 1.26 that the mirror on the moon really is 
there, and that the readers can check the veracity of this statement by visiting the 
moon themselves. 
105 A more complicated (modern) example for the synonymy of narrators is Operation 
Shylock by Philip Roth. Roth the narrator encounters another Philip Roth in the course 
of his journey, a persona which matches the historical information the real Philip Roth 
gives of his life, outside of the book. The competing figures of one and the same 
person bring into question the dichotomy of fiction and history, and underline the 
dangers of historicism.  
106 Whitmarsh (2013), 67 has argued, in recent discussion of the I-narrator in Achilles 
Tatius, that an ancient readership would automatically associate the anonymous I of a 
narrative with the identity of the actual, historical author. Lucian goes one step further 
and explicitly points to his identity, thus removing all doubt. 
107 On the fact that this is an epitaph on a gravestone, see Georgiadou and Larmour 
(1998), 212 and von Möllendorff (2000), 421-5. 
108 Cf. Ní Mheallaigh (2009), 23. 
109 As Kim (2010), 173 states: “In this sense his departure from the island and his 
journey home have already been narrated by Homer, and Lucian has been enclosed in 
the poet’s literary universe.” 
110 Cf. Zeitlin (2001), 247. 
111 On the overlap and mirroring of Odysseus’ narration with the primary narrative of 
the Odyssey, see, above all, Beck (2005). 
112 Cf. Kim (2010), 154. 
113 Ní Mheallaigh (2005a), 128. 
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114 Ní Mheallaigh (2005a), 128: The advertisement “injects a subversive element of 
doubt into the text. By knowingly constructing a polarity with Odysseus’ tales, which 
is ostensibly calculated to confirm the veracity of his tale, but paradoxically gives the 
game (it is a Fiktionalitätssignal), Socrates advertises the fictionality of the mythos”. 
115 This is only broadly true, of course: one need only read Dio’s Trojan Oration for a 
different view of Homer, for which see Kim (2010), 85-139. 
116 On this, see Baumbach (2013). 
117 Kim (2010), 168. 
118 καὶ ἡµεῖς πιστεύοµεν οὕτως ἔχειν. 
119 This tendency for subversive creativity on Odysseus’ part is reflected in his 
defence of Homer against Thersites: he reads and controls interpretation of what 
Homer originally created.  
120 Baumbach (2013), 272, discussing in particular the Nachleben of the VH, argues 
that the lack of ending is successful, as the text’s reception proves, in inviting the 
reader “to work out the closure for him/herself”; he lists a number works, from 
Cervantes to Jules Verne, which all added new adventures to Lucian’s True Stories. 
121 (2008), 421-2. 
